South Africa has a limited and fast-closing opportunity to move onto a sustained growth trajectory, with success hinging less on policy design, and more on political co-ordination and execution.

This is according to a new analysis by Johan Fourie, an economist based at Stellenbosch University. The analysis was done for the Bureau for Economic Research, and compares reform episodes in countries such as Poland, Chile, India, Germany, and Argentina, and finds that while crises open windows for reform, only credible political settlements turn those windows into lasting prosperity. The findings come as South Africa has continued to record near-zero per capita growth over the past decade and a half, in contrast to countries like Poland, where living standards doubled within two decades of reform.

The analysis identifies three major constraints shaping South Africa’s current trajectory.

The first is a political “war of attrition”, where competing factions delay reform in the hope that others will absorb the costs.

Fourie writes: “Reform happens only when the crisis becomes so severe that delay is costlier than concession. Think of it as a game of chicken. In Poland, hyperinflation and shortages made the cost of waiting unbearable – the Solidarity movement’s broad coalition meant no single group could offload the pain.

“In Chile, the 1982-83 banking crisis was deep enough to discredit both the military’s initial economic model, and the opposition’s maximalist demands, forcing a centrist convergence.”

The second is “status quo bias”, where uncertainty over who benefits from reform leads to widespread resistance, even when change would improve overall outcomes.

“Even when reform would benefit most people, rational uncertainty about who specifically will gain, and who will lose, produces collective resistance. People who might benefit from trade liberalisation or deregulation cannot be sure they will be among the winners, so they oppose the change. The result is paralysis even when the status quo is terrible,” Fourie says. He points to black economic empowerment (BEE) as an example of this in South Africa

The third is the role of “veto players”, where multiple political actors can either entrench reform or prevent it entirely.

“More veto players make policy change harder – but conditional on change, they also make reversal harder. This is what makes institutional constraints valuable. Poland’s [European Union] accession locked in reforms so thoroughly that no subsequent government could undo them.”

South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) reflects both the opportunity and risk embedded in this “veto-player” framework. While a multi-party coalition can help lock in reforms once agreed, it also raises the likelihood of gridlock if consensus cannot be reached.

International evidence also points to the importance of doing things in the right sequence. Countries that have achieved sustained growth prioritised visible, broadly beneficial reforms first, particularly in infrastructure and regulatory systems, before tackling more politically sensitive areas.

In the South African context, this places immediate emphasis on energy supply, logistics networks, water infrastructure, and administrative efficiency. Early signs of progress in electricity generation and public service delivery have begun to shift sentiment, says Fourie, though gains remain uneven.

More complex reforms, including labour market restructuring, and adjustments to BEE policy, are likely to face stronger resistance, and may require prior economic gains to build political support, he says.

Fourie warns that the current reform window may last only two to three years before electoral pressures begin to dominate coalition behaviour, with the next general election due to be held in 2029. Failure to deliver measurable improvements within that period could shift incentives away from co-operation towards political positioning.

“If by then the coalition has not delivered visible improvements, the incentive structure flips. Coalition partners start positioning for the election rather than co-operating on reform. The [African National Congress]’s internal factions begin calculating whether they are better off with or without the [Democratic Alliance]. The opposition parties outside the GNU – the [Economic Freedom Fighters], [uMkhonto weSizwe Party] – gain ammunition. The window closes,” Fourie says.

External risks, including elevated global energy prices linked to conflict in the Middle East, may further complicate the outlook by increasing input costs and dampening growth, he says.

Fourie concludes by saying South Africa stands at the fork between a path of sustained growth and one of continued stagnation. The outcome will depend on whether the GNU can maintain discipline, prioritise delivery, and sequence reforms effectively within a narrowing window of opportunity.